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NOTES
MUNICIPAL LIABILITY FOR RIOT DAMAGE
UNDER EMINENT DOMAIN
The severe confrontations of 1967, the civil disorders attending the
assassination of Martin Luther King, Jr., and the violent demonstra-
tions accompanying the major political conventions during the summer
of x968 resulted in substantial damage to private property.' Even
where it can be established that the municipal authorities involved in
riot control were negligent, the burden of the property losses has fallen
rather heavily upon the citizens and firms located within the riot affect-
ed areas. This financial burden is in part a result of the doctrine of
sovereign immunity which has historically foreclosed any private citi-
zen from bringing a tort action for damages as a consequence of gov-
ernmental negligence. Neither the federal government nor any of the
states or their political subdivisions may be sued by a private citizen
unless the government or its instrumentality consents to the suit. 2
Sovereign immunity has been modified to a degree by statutes3
which provide for compensation to victims of riot violence. These
statutes, while remedial to a certain degree, are not universally avail-
able to the damaged property owner because of their sporadic enact-
ment, vague draftsmanship, and lack of uniformity.4 However, inverse
condemnation proceedings based on the principle of eminent domain
may aid in avoiding the obstacles to recovery posed by the sovereign
immunity doctrine and the present lack of adequate remedial legisla-
tion.
In recent riots, most notably in Detroit in 1967 and in the District
of Columbia after the King assassination, municipalities decided that
official police policy throughout the disorders would be to restrict the
areas of stiff police resistance.6 In an effort to avoid bloodshed and to
deescalate riots, selected neighborhoods were designated as areas in
which no police action preventing property damage would be initiated.
7
'The costs arising out of the 1967 riots to insurers alone was $50 million.
Rottman, Riot Damage, Municipal Liability and Insurance, 1968 INS. L.J. 597.
FSee Borchard, Government Liability in Tort, 34 YALE L.J. 1, 6 (1924).
3Notes 18-27 infra.
'It has been recognized that legislation is probably the most logical and desir-
able solution to the problems created by the sovereign immunity doctrine. Borchard,
Government Liability in Tort, 34 YALE L.J. 1, 3 (1924).
""Inverse condemnation" is a term commonly used to represent suits on behalf
of property owners claiming -that private property has been taken by the govern-
ment without compensation. Notes 28-29 infra.
'The general policy reflected restraint on the part of police and a hesitancy
to deploy troop support. See generally Tiaam, Apr. 19, 1968 at 15; TME, Aug. 4,
1967 at 14; U.S. NEws & WoRLD REPORT, Apr. 22, 1968 at 27.
7Note 6 supra.
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Police openly permitted looting and destruction in these designated
sectors of the community, deliberately deciding to forego crime con-
trol for the general public benefit.8 Inasmuch as the private property
destroyed because of police inaction could be said to have been "taken"
for the public use, the theory of eminent domain may be applicable.
In ,the past, the sovereign's immunity to tort actions brought by its
citizens has kept property owners from recovering for damages result-
ing from civil disorders. The doctrine of sovereign immunity originated
with the ancient maxim "the king can do no wrong."9 Immunity to
private suit was first extended -to a municipality in the English case of
Russell v. Men of Devon.10 That decision was based on the ground
that the defendent county was unincorporated and had no corporate
fund out of which to satisfy a judgment." The first American decision
to uphold the sovereign immunity of a municipality was Mower v. In-
habitants of Leicester.12 Although that court's decision was based on
Men of Devon, the fact that Leicester was a statutorily created corpora-
tion with ample resources to satisfy a judgment was not discussed.13 On
the basis of the Leicester decision, the theory of sovereign immunity
has spread to practically every American jurisdiction.14
One of the most widespread aspects of sovereign immunity is the
8 Police restrained from gunplay, heeding the Kerner Commission's warning,
against the use of excessive force. TIME, Apr. 19, 1968 at 15; REPORT OF THE NATIONAL
ADvIsoRY COMMISSION ON CIVIL DISORDERS chs. 11-12 (1968) [hereinafter referred to
as REPORT OF NAT'L ADvIs. COmm'N].
'The rationale for this type of thinking appears to be the King's overwhelming
superiority of power. For example:
For all jurisdiction implies superiority of power... and the
sentence of a court would be contemptible, unless that court
had power to command the execution of it: but who ... shall
command the King?
1 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *242.
Modem students have come to the realization that the maxim sprung from
the knowledge that, holding the King accountable for his wrongs would be im-
possible. One student writer has said:
The real basis of the king's immunity from suit was the impos-
sibility of enforcing a judgment against him. Thus, the ancient
maxim might more accurately be phrased, "The King cannot be
held to account for his wrongs."
Comment, Ohio Sovereign Immunity: Long Live the King, 28 OHIo ST. L.J. 75 (1967).
o100 Eng. Rep. 359 (1788).
"It was also noted that "it is better that an individual should sustain an injury
than that the'public should suffer an inconvenience." 1OO Eng. Rep. at 362.
129 Mass. 247 (1812).
"Id. at 248.
"For a representative survey of the status of sovereign immunity in each of
the fifty states, see Hamill, The Changing Concept of Sovereign Immunity, 13
DEFENSE L.J. 653, 664 (1964).
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refusal by the courts to impose liability on a municipality for its
torts.15 Even though city officials may have been negligent in perform-
ing their governmental duties, the municipality is immune from lia-
bility.'6 The control of riots and mob violence is generally recognized
as a governmental duty, and consequently municipalities enjoy im-
munity from damage suits as a result of their failure to exercise ade-
quate riot control.' 7
However, at the present time, many states impose liability by stat-
ute against local governments for damage caused by rioting mobs.'8
In addition, five states currently impose personal liability upon city
officials who negligently fail to suppress civil disorders.19 Nevertheless,
inconsistent definitions of essential terms such as "riot!' and "mob",
nonuniformity with respect to damage coverage, ,and hazily phrased
conditions precedent to recovery hamper the uniform administration
of the statutes. Moreover, because many state statutes were enacted
shortly after the Civil War to provide compensation for personal in-
jury occasioned by the activities of lynch mobs, they are not designed
'-See Antieau, Statutory Expansion of Municipal Tort Liability, 4 ST. Louis
U.L.J. 351 (1957); Rottman, Riot Damage, Municipal Liability and Insurance, 1968
INS. L.J. 597, 598.
"See, e.g., Baily v. Mayor of New York, 3 Hill 531, 539 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1842);
W. PROSSER, ToRS § 125 (3 d ed. 1964).
17See Campbell v. Montgomery, 53 Ala. 527 (1875) (the duty to enforce laws
suppressing unlawful assembly was governmental, not proprietary, and no private
action could lie for negligence in exercising this duty). In Mu7r7aine v. Wilson Line,
Inc., 270 App. Div. 372, 59 N.Y.S.2d 750 (1946) the court stated:
The law is established that a municipality is answerable for the
negligence of its agents in exercising a proprietary function, and
at least for their negligence of commission in exercising a govern-
mental function ... but a municipality is not liable for its failure
to exercise a governmental function, such as to provide police or
fire protection.
59 N.Y.S.2d at 753.
18
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 7-108 (1958); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 12-203, 12-201
(Supp. 1969); Ky. R v. STAT. § 411.100(8) (Supp. 1976); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17,
§ 3354 (1964); MD. ANN CODE art. 82, §§ 1 -3 (1969); MASS. ANN. LAws ch. 269,
§ 8 (1968); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 373.28 (1968); Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 537.140-537.16o
(1953); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 11-1503, § 94-5314 (1947); NEm. RrV. STAT. §§
1001-1009 (1943); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 31:53-31:55 (1955); N.J. STAT. ANN.
§§ 2A:48:1-2A:48:9 (1952); N.Y. GEN. MUNic. LAW § 71 (McKinney 1965); N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 162-23 (1952); OHio REV. CODE ANN. §§ 3761.01-3761.10 (Baldwin
1964); PA. STAT. tit. 16, §§ 11821-11826 (1956), PA. STAr. tit. 18, § 3765 (1963); R.I. GEN.
LAWS ANN. § 45-15-13 (1957); S.C. CODE ANN. 16-1o3 - i6-io8 (1962); W.VA. CODE ANN.
§ 61-6-12 (1966); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 66.o91 (1965).
"MoNT. REV. CODES ANN. § 94-5314 (1947); N.Y. GEN. MUNIc. LAW § 71
(McKinney 1965); PA. STAT. tit. 16, § 11822 (1956); W.VA. CODE ANN. § 61-6-12
(1966); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 66.o91 (1965).
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to deal with racial or political riots which appear to be directed toward
the destruction of property. Unfortunately, most state statutes do not
provide comprehensive damage coverage; many deal exclusively with
recovery for personal injuries20 while others deal only with property
damage.21 Some compensation statutes allow recovery only when the
municipality has prior notice of the existing riot situation. 22 Because
many riots begin suddenly,23 prior notice statutes appear to preclude
the damaged property owner from recovery. Some riot damage statutes
also bar recovery if the damaged property owner is contributorily
negligent.
24
OMany statutes are directed toward allowing recovery by the dependents and
representatives of victims of lynch mob activities. For example, "When any
person shall be lynched, the county in which the lynching occurred shall be liable
in damages to -the dependents of the person lynched...." MINN. STAT. ANN. §
373.28 (1968); "The legal representative of a person dying from injuries received
from lynching by a mob, may recover from the county in which such injury
occurred .... " Omo REv. CoDE ANN. § 3761.o4 (Baldwin 1954):
-"Some state statutes make no reference to personal injury. For example, "A
city or county shall be liable to a person whose property is destroyed or injured
therein by a mob or riot...." N.Y. GEN. MUNIc. LAw § 71 (McKinney 1965). As
a further example,
Whenever any property ... shall be destroyed or be injured ...
by any persons to the number of six (6) or more unlawfully,
routously, riotously or tumultuously assembled, the town or city
within which said property was situated shall be liable to idemnify
the owner thereof....
R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 45-15-13 (1956).
2Prior notice on the part of municipal officials appears to be a prerequisite to
recovery under some statutes. For example,
Nor shall a recovery be had unless the claimant ... shall have,
immediately after being apprized of a threat or attempt to destroy
or injure his property by a mob or riot, notified the mayor or
chief executive officer or chief of police of the municipality or
the sheriff of the county, as the case may be, of the facts brought
to his knowledge.
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:48-3 (1952).
For an example of notice statutes generally, see N.Y. GEN. MUNIC. LAW § 50
(McKinney x965).
=For example, in Cincinnati, Ohio, police began investigating reports of
stone throwing at 7:oo p.m. and rioting broke out only fifteen minutes later. In
Tampa, Florida, disruptions starting at 7:oo p.m. were occassioned by an arrest
at 5:30 p.m. REPORT OF NAT'L ADvis. CAOMM'N, supra note 8, at 22-27.
2 The benefits of statutory relief may be lost if the claimant can be shown to
be contributorily negligent during the riot violence. For example, "If it appears
at the trial that the destruction of or injury to the property was occasioned or in
any manner aided, sanctioned or permitted by the negligence of the claimant,
there shall be no recovery." N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:48-3 (1952); "No person shall
be entitled to the benefits of the foregoing provision [allowing personal action on
the case against the town] if it shall appear that the destruction of his property was
caused by his illegal or improper conduct .... " N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31:54 (1955).
It is difficult to determine the extent and scope of contributory negligence in
NOTES
The difficulty in recovering under riot damage compensation
statutes is even further complicated by a clause in many statutes re-
quiring the damaged property owner to use "all reasonable diligence"
in preventing property damages. 25 It is not clear to what extent the
individual property owner must go while employing "all reasonable
diligence" to avoid riot destruction, but it has been held that the pro-
perty owner need not go so far as to endanger human life.2 6 Moreover,
the "all reasonable diligence" standard has been satisfied in the ab-
sence of prior notice to the municipality because emergency conditions
prevented such notice on the part of the property owner.2 7
However, where private property has been "taken" for "public use"
absent condemnation, and it appears that the municipality has no in-
tention to bring condemnation proceedings, a suit for just compensa-
tion may be initiated by the damaged property owner.28 This proce-
dure has been called a suit in "inverse condemnation" or "reverse con-
a riot context. For example, shop owners may have been contributorily negligent
in overcharging local customers, thereby locking them into frustrating ghetto
situations that have been one of the major causes of past riots. REPORT OF NAT'L
ADvs. COMM'N, supra note 8, at 5.
,The "all reasonable diligence" clause appears to be standard in most state
recovery statutes. For example, "Nor shall a recovery be bad unless the claimant
used all reasonable diligence to prevent the destruction or injury...." N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 2A:4 8- 3 (1952); ". . . if the owner of such property uses all reasonable
diligence to prevent its destruction or injury...." MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. h.
269, § 8 (1959); ('- . . and such person shall have used all reasonable diwgence to
prevent such damage...." N.Y. GEN. MUNi. LAW § 71 (McKinney 1965); "... pro-
vided the owner of such property shall use all reasonable diligence to prevent its
destruction or injury by such unlawful assembly...." R.I GEN. LAws ANN. §
45-15-13 (1956)-
"Spring Valley Coal Co. v. Spring Valley, 65 Ill. App. 571 (1895); Palmer v.
Smith, 147 Wis. 70, 132 N.W. 614 (1911).
FE.g., Roy v. Hampton, io8 N.H. 51, 226 A.2d 870 (1967); Feinstein v. City
of New York, 157 Misc. 157, 283 N.Y.S. 335 (Mun. Ct. 1935).
2Nichols, in his treatise on eminent domain, has described the procedure for a
suit by the damaged property owner in the following manner:
When, however, the award, though absolutely due and payable, is
not a judgment, the owner is obliged to institute judicial proceed-
ings to enforce payment. In such a case the common law actions of
debt, trover, or assumpsit, or their modern substitutes will lie
unless the legislature has provided a specific remedy .... In the
event of [statutory] inadequacy, however the owner may pursue his
common law remedy .... In the absence of an exclusive statutory
remedy, an owner, whose property has been taken for public use
without the payment of compensation, may recover the value of
the property so appropriated.
NICHors, THE LAw OF EMINENT DOMAIN § 28.11 (Rev. 3 Ed. 1965) [hereinafter cited
to as NImoLs].
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demnation." 29 It is therefore submitted that individuals and businesses
which have suffered property damage as a result of a municipal policy
permitting looting and destruction during violent civil disorders may
bring inverse condemnation suits for damages under the theory of
eminent domain. However, because the concepts of "taking" and
"public use" are crucial to recovery, 30 these key terms must be afforded
rather liberal judicial interpretation if an inverse condemnation suit is
to be successful.
It is well established in Anglo-American law that private property
shall not be taken for public use without just compensation. This
principle has been articulated in the Bill of Rights31 and in most
state constitutions. 32 The traditions protecting the private property
owner are found in Roman Law, the Code of Napoleon, and in the
legal system of the American colonies. 33 Despite this general agreement
as to the "just compensation" principle itself, its application has been
historically uncertain.34 However, the constitutional guarantees which
are inherent in the theory of eminent domain-that private property
shall not be taken for public use without just compensation-should
be applied.
Eminent domain has been defined as
. .. the power of the nation or a sovereign state to take, or to
authorize the taking of, private property for a public use without
the owner's consent, conditioned upon the payment to the
owner of just compensation.35
-"The terms "inverse condemnation" and "reverse condemnation" are com-
monly employed to represent the suits by property owners based on claims that the
government has taken property without compensation. NinoLs states:
A taking in pais [absent statutory authorization] has been char-
acterized as a "de facto" taking or a "common-law" taking and,
because of the self-executing character of the constitutional
provision with respect to compensation, has given rise to an action
which has been variously denominated as a suit in "inverse
condemnation" or "reverse condemnation."
NICHoLs, supra note 28, at § 25.41 [2].
ONsmnoLs, supra note 28, at § 1.11.
'The fifth amendment to the Constitution provides that "...nor shall private
property be taken for public use, without just compensation." US. CONsT. amend. V.
MAll of the states except Kansas, New Hampshire, and North Carolina have
constitutional provisions prohibiting the taking of private property without just
compensation. NIcHoLs, supra note 28, at § 1.3.
33See Cormack, Legal Concepts in Cases of Eminent Domain, 41 YALE L.J. 221,
222 (1931).
"Id.
3Ohio Turnpike Comm'n v. Ellis, 164 Ohio St. 377, 131 N.E_-d 397, 401
(1955); NicHoLs, supra note 28, at § i.xi.
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The power of eminent domain is most frequently exercised by a stat-
utorily empowered governmental body, competent to condemn private
property for public use. 36 While the general rule in eminent domain
cases is that the condemning authority does not become liable for
compensation until title to private property is officially (de jure)
taken,37 it is well settled that a de facto taking does occur when there
has been a physical invasion of the condemnee's property or a direct
legal restraint placed upon its use.38 Damage caused by riots is in the
nature of physical invasion and examples of physical invasions con-
stituting de facto takings are abundant.3 9 The physical invasion of
property by rioters may well constitute a de facto taking and thus
satisfy the "taking" 40 requirement of eminent domain.4 1
During a riot, it is not actually the municipality that does the tak-
ing-it is the rioters and looters. However, to establish a taking, it is
33NIcHors, supra note 28, at § 24.2.
mSee, e.g., N.Y. CONDEMNATION LAiW § 4 (McKinney 195o).
"E.g., Leeds v. State, 2o N.Y.2d 701, 229 N.E.2d 446, 282 N.Y.S.2d 767 (1967);
Keystone Associates v. Moerdler, 19 N.Y.2d 78, 224 N.E.2d 700, 278 N.Y.S.2d 185
(1966).
De facto takings have resulted from numerous types of legal restraints. See, e.g.,
Foster v. City of Detroit, 405 F.2d 138 (6th Cir. 1968) (the filing of a 1is pendens);
State v. Stefaniak, 250 Ind. 631, 238 NE.2d 451 (1968) (depressed market value as
a result of a zoning ordinance); Forster v. Scott, 135 N.Y. 577, 32 N.E. 976 (1893)
(filing of a planning map for the city).
mSee, e.g., United States v. Cress, 243 U.S. 316 (1917) (washing away of riparian
land); Richards v. Washington Terminal Co., 233 U.S. 546 (1914) (smoke from
nearby railroads); United States v. Lynah, 188 U.S. 445 (19o3) (raising groundvater
tables); Bauer v. County of Ventura, 45 Cal. 2d 276, 289 P.2d 1 (1955) (pollution
resulting from poorly constructed sewage systems and drainage ditches); City of
Atlanta v. Kenny, 83 Ga. App. 823, 64 S.E.2d 912 (1951) (removal of lateral support);
Renninger v. State, 70 Idaho 170, 213 P.2d 911 (195o) (bridge construction flooded
plaintiff's land); Lage v. Pottawattamie County, 232 Iowa 944, 5 N.W.2d x61 (1942)
(floods caused by the construction of highways and dams); Cerniglia v. City of
New Orleans, 234 La. 730, 101 So. 2d 218 (1958) (eliminating means of ingress and
egress); Donaldson v. City of Bismark, 71 N.D. 592, 3 N.W.2d 8o8 (1942) (causing
gas, smoke, and noxious ordors to invade plaintiff's premises); Butler v. Frontier
Tel. Co., 186 N.Y. 486, 79 N.E. 716 (19o6) (erecting telephone poles over plaintiff's
premises).
" he commonly accepted concept of "taking" recognizes that "under the
constitutional provisions it is not necessary that the land should be absolutely
taken." Pumpelly v. Green Bay Co., 8o U.S. (13 Wall.) x66, 179 (1871).
"In considering the most likely damages resulting from civil disorders, injury
to merchandise, furniture, showcases, and other personal property is readily
foreseen. Since this discussion relies heavily upon case law concerning real pro-
perty, it is pointed out that the theory of eminent domain is applicable to all
property, real and personal. See, e.g., United States v. 19.86 Acres, 141 F.2d 344
(7 th Cir. 1944) (construction material); Weiner v. Fulton County, 113 Ga. App.
343, 148 S.E.2d 1,3 (1966) (value of attorney's time); Illinois Cities Water Co. v.
City of Mt. Vernon, ii Ill. App. 2d 547, 144 N.E.2d 729 (1957) (trucks, tools,
office furniture, maintenance equipment).
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not necessary that the taking be performed directly by the municipal-
ity.42 Arguably, the taker must purport to act under some color of
public authority. A decision by municipal authorities to allow looting,
however, is communicated rapidly, and looters may soon purport to
act under consent from the local government-if not with complete
authority.
43
During a riot, the town or country usually asserts no property in-
terests and makes no attempt to actually use private property or to
claim the accretion of any legal rights; however, the local government
has still "taken" the property.44 The individual's property has been
destroyed as a result of municipal policy and the act of destruction, by
itself, usually constitutes a "taking" requiring just compensation.45
Even in the absence of actual physical destruction, many states have
viewed the condemnation process as a deprivation of a property owner's
rights, rather than necessarily the acquisition of additional rights by
the condemnor.46 The United States Supreme Court47 has recognized
12E.g., Cavanaugh v. Boston, 139 Mass. 426, x N.E. 834 (1885); Lovett v. West
Virginia Central Gas Co., 65 W. Va. 739, 65 SXE. 196 (1909).
'For example, TIME reported the following episode during the Detroit riots
of 1967:
As police gave ground, the number of looters grew. "They won't
shoot," an eleven-year-old Negro boy said coolly, as a pack of
looters fled at the approach of a busload of police. "The mayor
said they aren't supposed to."
TINtE, Aug. 4, 1967 at 14.
Additional support for the proposition that the rioters, as indirect instru-
mentalities, act for the municipal government in "taking" riot-destroyed property
is presented in the definition of "eminent domain" found in the text accompanying
note 35 supra. The sovereign state has not only the power to take, but also ". .. to
authorize the taking of . . ." private property. Ohio Turnpike Comm'n v. Ellis.
164 Ohio St. 377, 131 N.E.2d 397, 40i (1955) (emphasis added).
"Notes 47-5o infra.
'5 See, e.g., Oswego & S.R.R. v. State, 226 N.Y. 351, 124 N.E. 8 (1919) in which
the highest court of New York held that the destruction of the plaintiff's bridge by
the state constituted a taking requiring payment of just compensation.
"See, e.g., Cereghino v. State Highway Comm'n, 230 Ore. 439, 370 P.2d 694
(1962). In City of Buffalo v. Clement, 34 App. Div. 2d 24, 311 N.Y.S.2d 98 (197o)
in which the court stated:
... there was a de facto taking... inasmuch as the City's acts forced
[the property owner] to move from its property at that time,
rendering the property not only unsalable but unrentable and
yielding no income whatever. In so holding, we stress that there
is a de facto taking absent physical invasion or legal restraint in the
instant case only because the condemning authority has so in-
terfered with the use of the subject property that essential elements
of ownership have been destroyed and substantial justice cannot
otherwise be had.
311 N.Y.S.2d at io6.
'United States v. General Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373 (1945)-
NOTES
that "[t]he courts have held that the deprivation of the former owner
rather than the accretion of a right or interest to the sovereign con-
stitutes the taking.' '48 In a riot situation, the absence of actual occupa-
tion and use of private property by the governing body appears to be of
little importance, since it is the loss to the owner, not the gain to the
municipality, which is significant when determining whether a "taking"
has occurred.
One additional aspect of taking by eminent domain which deserves
consideration is the question of governmental intent. The govern-
ment's intent is a prerequisite to establishing a taking requiring com-
pensation, 49 and during a riot emergency, the municipality might not
intend to take any specific private property. However, the intent re-
quired to constitute an eminent domain taking is kindred to the tort
theory of intent in which intent is said to exist when an individual acts
with knowledge that a given result is substantially certain to be pro-
duced.5 0 In the midst of civil disorder, governmental policy may not
be directed toward the acquisition of private property, but the munici-
pality may adopt a course of action, the natural consequence of which
is to "take" the property.51 And even though the municipality may
have employed a procedure other than that of eminent domain, as is
foreseeable during a civil disturbance, a "taking" is still the result.
52
By allowing the looting of selected areas of the community, the muni-
cipality deprives individuals of their interest in private property
through physical invasion of the property with the knowledge that
destruction is substantially certain to result. Consequently, it is reason-
SId. at 378. See, e.g., 1iooo Acres v. United States, 152 F.2d 566 (sth Cir. 1945);
Trinity River Authority v. Chain, 437 S.W.2d 887 (rex. Civ. App. 1969).
"'Biggs Rental Co. v. United States, 353 F.2d 1o13 (Ct. Cl. 1965), held that "to
constitute a taking there must be an intent on the part of the [government] to take
the plaintiff's properties, or, at least, an intention -to do an act the natural conse-
quences of which was to take the property." 353 F.2d at 1017.
nSee, e.g., Garratt v. Daily, 46 Wash. 2d 197, 279 P.2d xo91 (1955); W. PROSSER,
TORTS § 8 (3d ed. 1964).
nThis concept of intent is embraced by Sayre v. United States, 282 F. Supp.
175 (N.D. Ohio 1967) in which the court stated:
Yet, as seen, Biggs Rental Company, [note 49, supra] holds that
an intention taking of property occurs if the government intention-
ally does an act "the natural consequence of which was to take
property."
282 F. Supp. at 185.
See B. Amusement Co. v. United States, i8o F. Supp. 386, 389 (Ct. Cl. 196o). But see
Angelle v. State, 212 La. 1069, 34 So. 2d 321 (1948).
u2The New York Court of Claims has recognized that "[t]he question of whether
there has been an actual appropriation of the land is entirely apart from the pro-
cedure ordinarily employed in taking it." Rizzo v. State, 202 Misc. 439, 111 N.Y.S.2d
151, 153 (Ct. Cl. 1951).
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able to conclude that a "taking," in the eminent domain context, has
occurred.
An inverse condemnation suit involves not only the "taking" issue,
but also the question of whether the taking has been for a "public
use."53 The preservation of peace and order is the public use to which
property damaged by controlled-area riots is dedicated.54 The govern-
ment maintains peace and order through police power, a valid exercise
of which does not require compensation.55
The police power may be explained as the power of the sovereign to
prevent persons under its jurisdiction from conducting themselves or
using their property to the detriment of the general public welfare.5 6
The general welfare parallels what has been included by one authority
on eminent domain in his description of "public use"-the preservation
of the public's health, safety, and comfort.
57
Affirmative municipal actions in response to emergencies consist-
ently fall within the general category of an exercise of police power by
local government.55 But damage losses resulting from a policy decision
to forego control may, on the other hand, be an act of eminent domain.
There are similarities between police power, which imposes no duty to
compensate, and eminent domain, which does. There appears to be no
53Notes 31, 35 supra.
"Included in the police power are the laws which are necessary to provide for
the peace and order of the community and to promote "domestic tranquility" and
the "comfort and quiet of all persons." 16 Am. JUR. 2d Constitutional Law § S
(1964), and cases cited therein.
IsHinrichs v. Iowa State Highway Comm'n, 260 Iowa 1115, 152 N.W.2d 248, 255
(1967); Waggoner v. Gleghorn, 378 S.W.2d 47, 50 (Tex. Sup. Ct. 1964); NICHOLS, supra
note 28, at § 1.42.
5Fertilizing Co. v. Hyde Park, 97 U.S. 659, 667 (1878); State ex rel. Penrose
Inv. Co. v. McKelvey, 301 Mo. 1, 256 S.W. 474, 476 (1923). In Hathorn v. Natural
Carbonic Gas Co., 194 N.Y. 326, 87 N.E. 504 (19o9), the court in quoting Cooley's
treatise on constitutional limitations stated:
The police power of a state, in a comprehensive sense, embraces its
whole system of internal regulation, by which the state seeks, not
only to preserve the public order and to prevent offenses against
the state, but also to establish for the intercourse of citizens with
citizens those rules of good manners and good neighborhood which
are calculated to prevent a conflict of fights, and to insure to each
the uninterrupted enjoyment of his own so far as is reasonably
consistent with a like enjoyment of rights by others.
87 N.E. at 51o. See T. COOLEY, THE GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CONsTrrUTIONAL LAw
IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 289 (4th ed. 1931), for substantially the same
language.
61 NICHOLS, supra note 28, at § 7.22.
O'See notes 94-98 infra. But cf. note 99 infra.
hard and fast standard for distinguishing between them.59
In an effort to determine whether police power or eminent domain
is involved, some courts have looked toward the "controlling pur-
pose"60 of the governmental activity. Conger v. Pierce County6' in-
volved an action against a county by a private property owner whose
land had been eroded because of public improvements to a nearby
navigable stream. In that case, the court emphasized the following rule
for distinguishing betveen police power and eminent domain:
Eminent domain takes private property for a public use, while
the police power regulates its use and enjoyment, or, if it takes
or damages it, it is not a taking or damaging for the public use,
but to conserve the safety, morals, health, and general welfare
of the public.
6 2
The court, therefore, looked primarily toward the controlling purpose
of the public improvement. "Public use," the requisite purpose for
taking private property by eminent domain, was distinguished from
conserving the "safety, morals, health, and general welfare of the
public," the purpose for valid exercises of police power.
However, in City of Schenectady v. Furman,6 a case involving pro-
perty damage due to a municipal resolution resulting in the appropria-
tion of a portion of Furman's property to provide for a new channel
for a waterway flowing over his property, the court recognized that
while the purpose of the resolution was to eliminate stagnant de-
posits ". . . detrimental to [the public] health . ".... 64 the city's action
constituted an exercise of eminent domain.6 5 The purpose of the
public improvement in this case was the preservation of the health
and safety of the community's citizens, a police power purpose under
Conger, yet the court held that the effects of this improvement resulted
in an exercise of eminent domain. The Furman decision indicates
that the "controlling purpose" test employed in cases such as Conger
may not lead to consistent results.
'The fact that "tests" for distinguishing between police power and eminent
domain are not to be arbitrarily applied is brought out by the following excerpt:
"Many jurists seem to consider that any taking in behalf of the public health and
safety is necessarily an exercise of the police power, but this is clearly an error...."
NichoLS, supra note 28, at § 7.515.
O0Conger v. Pierce County, 116 Wash. 27, 198 P. 377, 381 (1921).
cl116 Wash. 27, 198 P. 377 (1921).
e1d. at 38o.
63145 N.Y. 482, 40 N.E. 221 (1895).
eId. at 221.
-'he court held that "the city had no right or power to take and appropriate
his lands ... without rendering him compensation therefor, either under the
constitution or the statutes." 40 N.E. at 222.
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Since an analysis of "controlling purpose" may not always be useful
in distinguishing between police power and eminent domain, another
test may be appropriate. It is said that police power is exercised through
regulation while eminent domain is a taking.0 If municipal policy is
based on the police power, regulations formulated under the exercise
of that power, so far as they relate to property, are negative in char-
acter.0 7 A man cannot be compelled under the police power to put his
property to any particular use, no matter how beneficial to the public,
although he may be compelled to refrain from any particular use
which is detrimental to the public. 68 A municipal policy permitting riot
damage to private property forces the affected citizens to devote their
property to an affirmative use-the preservation of peace and order
throughout other areas of the community. Putting private property to
this use is thus in the nature of eminent domain and, as such, the
municipality is obliged to compensate the property owners for the
taking.6 9
In certain instances, the distinction between regulation and taking
may be tenuous. For example, in In re Clinton Water District,70 the
state took water from a fresh water lake for domestic use by a water dis-
trict. As a consequence ,state legislation required that boating, swimm-
ing, and fishing in the lake be discontinued. Although restrictions on
the harmful use of property are usually held to be valid exercises of
police power,7' the court found that the effect of these regulations was a
material depreciation in the value of the riparian landowner's pro-
perty and awarded compensation. This case involved a regulation of
property benefiting the public safety and health that nevertheless was
found to constitute a taking under eminent domain. 72 If restrictions
66The "taking/regulation" distinction is commonly used when the courts attempt
to distinguish between police power and eminent domain. For example:
The distinguishing characteristic between eminent domain and the
police power is that the former involves the taking of property be-
cause of its need for the public use while the latter involves the
regulation of such property to prevent the use thereof in a manner
that is detrimental to the public interest.
NICHOLS, supra note 28, at § 142.
76 Am. JUR. 2d Constitutional Law § 290 (1964).
6'See Bowes v. City of Aberdeen, 58 Wash. 535, 109 P. 369, 372 (1910).
"Notes 1-33 supra.
S036 Wash. 2d 284, 218 P.2d 3o9 (195o).
7'E.g., St. Louis & San Francisco Ry. v. Mathews, 165 U.S. 1, 23-27 (1897);
Crowley v. Christensen, 137 U.S. 86, go (i8go).
72Note 74 infra. It may be argued that a particular infringment might ne
considered an exercise of police power to one group of people and an exercise of
eminent domain as to another group. For example, in In re Clinton Water Dist.,
36 Wash. 2d 284, 218 P.2d 3o9 (195o) , the state regulations may have been a valid
NOTES
upon the use of property actually deprive an individual of the bene-
ficial use and enjoyment of his private property or materially depress
its value,7 3 such regulations will usually be considered by the courts as
an eminent domain taking rather than a valid exercise of police
power.7
4
Even if such tests as the "controlling purpose" or the regulation/
taking distinction were consistently accurate indications of whether
police power or eminent domain has been exercised, the government,
even under the police power, cannot actually take property for public
use without compensation. Such action is repugnant to the Constitu-
tional guarantee that private property shall not be taken without just
compensation.
75
[W]hen land or other property is actually taken from the owner
... by the public authorities, the constitutional obligation to
exercise of police power as to the members of the public who wished to swim and
fish in the lake and also an equally valid expression of the power of eminent
domain as to the riparian landowner. Consequently, there may be precedent for a
theory calling for evaluation of each governmental action with respect -to its effect
on a particular plaintiff. In a controlled-riot situation, the municipality's policy
may be a valid exercise of police power as to those citizens residing in areas of
the community not endangered by the disorders and also an act of eminent domain
as to those citizens located within the riot area whose property has been destroyed.
7In United States v. Central Eureka Mining Co., 357 U.S. 155 (1958), the
Supreme Court recognized that "action in the form of a regulation can so diminish
the value of property as to constitute a taking." 357 U.S. at 168. State courts have
also recognized that property owners have a right to compensation if regulations
significantly diminish property values. For instance,
.. zoning cannot be used as a substitute for eminent domain
proceedings so as to defeat the constitutional requirement for the
payment of just compensation in the case of the taking of private
property for public use by depressing values and so reducing the
amount of damages to be paid.
Congressional School of Aeronautics v. State Roads Comm'n, 218 Md. 236, 146 A.2d
558, 560 (Ct. App. 1958); see, e.g., City of Scotsbluff v. Winters Creek Canal Co.,
155 Neb. 723, 53 N.W.2d 543 (1952); Ackerman v. Port of Seattle, 55 Wash. 2d
400, 348 P.2d 664 (196o).
"See, e.g., Treigle v. Acme Homestead Ass'n, 297 U.S. 189 (1936); Mid-Way
Cabinet Fixture Mfg. v. County of San Joaquin, 257 Cal. App. 2d 181, 65 Cal.
Rptr. 37 (1968); Cleaver v. Board of Adjustment, 414 Pa. 367, 2oo A.2d 4o8 (1964).
A igo6 opinion of the United States Supreme Court points toward the limita-
tions on police power regulations by stating:
Private property cannot be taken without compensation for public
use under a police regulation relating strictly to the public health,
the public morals or the public safety, any more than under a
police regulation having no relation to such matters, but only to
the general welfare.
Chicago B. & Q. Ry. v. Illinois ex rel. State Drainage Comm'rs, 2oo U.S. 561,
592'93 (19o6)
•
7U.S. CONST. amend. V, supra note 31.
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make just compensation arises, however much the use to which
the property is put may enhance the public health, morals or
safety.
7 6
The construction of hospitals,77 the building of fire houses,78 and the
abolition of hazardous grade crossings79 are all clearly in the interest of
public health and safety, but private land and buildings may not be
taken without liability upon the taker for compensation. Even though
the municipality allows the taking of private property during civil dis-
orders as an exercise of police power to preserve the health, safety, and
welfare of its citizens, the court should not be required to reach a find-
ing which denies compensation. An eminent domain decision may
result.8 0
The property rights of individuals are subordinate to valid exer-
cises of police power.8s A basic standard which limits all exercises of
the police power is the requirement that the power should extend only
to such measures as are reasonable.8 2 In order for a police measure to
be reasonable, the means adopted must be reasonably necessary and
appropriate for the accomplishment of objectives that fall within the
scope of the power.83 However, there is no certain test which can be
applied to determine whether any particular act is reasonable,8 4 be-
cause questions of reasonableness are usually matters of degree. If a
governmental action based on the police power is challenged as an un-
reasonable invasion of rights guaranteed by the constitution, it is the
7
0NICHOL., supra note 28, at § 1.42[1].
"7Manning v. Bruce, 186 Mass. 282, 71 N.E. 537 (1904).
78Allen v. City of Detroit, 167 Mich. 464, 13 N.W. 317 (1911).
ilCity of Chicago v. Jackson, 196 Ill. 496, 63 N.E. 1013 (0o2); Illinois Cent.
R.R. v. Moriarity, 135 Tenn. 446, 186 S.W. 1o53 (1916).
"For additional examples of taking for purposes akin to the public welfare
category, see City of Chicago v. Le Moyne, 119 F. 662 (7 th Cir. 1902) (involving the
construction of a viaduct); Bernard v. State Dept. of Public Works, 127 So. 2d 774
(La. Ct. App. 1961) (a drainage project).
aE.g., Eiger v. Garrity, 246 U.S. 97, 102 (1918); Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 13,
125 (1876).
8See, e.g., Nashville, C. & St. L. Ry. v. Walters, 294 U.S. 405 (1935); Marrs v.
City of Oxford, 32 F.2d 134 (8th Cir. 1929); Miller v. Bd. of Public Works, 195
Cal. 477, 234 P. 381 (1925); East Side Levee & San. Dist. v. East St. L. & C. Ry., 279
Ill. 123, 116 N.E. 720 (1917); People v. Perretta, 253 N.Y. 3o, 171 N.E. 72 (1930).
"See, e.g., Froelich v. City of Cleveland, 99 Ohio St 376, 124 N.E. 212 (1919).
"See, e.g., Lemieux v. Young, 211 U.S. 489 (19o9). When considering the
reasonableness of any exercise of police power, the circumstances surrounding the
exercise are important and there is no abstract test which is easily applied. "There
is no certain test of what is a reasonable interference with the enjoyment of the
rights of property or the personal rights guaranteed by the Constitution." Board
of Zoning App. v. Decatur Ind. Co. of Jehovah's Witnessess, 233 Ind. 83, 117 N.E.2d
115, 18 (1954).
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duty of the courts to determine whether the exercise is necessary for the
public good.8 5 When determining the degree of reasonableness of an
exercise of police power, the courts use a balancing process to weigh the
public benefit against the burden placed upon the private property
owner.8 6
The theory of balancing benefits against burdens has been com-
monly applied to cases concerning zoning ordinances.8 7 The courts de-
termine first whether the property infringement is a valid exercise of
police power8 s or, in the alternative, whether the action can be sus-
tained as an exercise of eminent domain. In making their decision, the
courts usually decide whether the benefit to the public health and
safety as a result of municipal policy is very great, while, on the other
hand, the corresponding burden on the individual constitutes a rea-
sonable interference with private property.8 9 Such a conclusion usually
leads to a finding of a valid exercise of police power.90 The destruction
of property however, is the most extreme exercise of police power and
is justified only with in the narrowest limits of actual necessity unless
the municipality chooses to pay compensation.91 If municipal policy
results in interference with property causing a substantial burden to the
'Alabama State Fed. of Labor v. McAdory, 246 Ala. i, 18 So. 2d 8io (1944),
cert. denied, 325 U.S. 45o (1945); Wholesale Tobacco Dealers Bureau v. National
Candy & Tobacco Co., 11 Cal. 2d 634, 82 P.2d 3 (1938).
6The United States Supreme Court has implied that a balancing of benefits
and burdens test is applicable when determining the reasonableness of zoning
ordinances. The court has said:
To justify the State in ... interposing its authority in behalf of the
public, it must appear, first, that the interests of the public...
require such interference; and, second, that the means are reason-
ably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose, and not un-
duly oppressive upon individuals.
Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 595 (1962), quoting Lauton v.
Steele, 152 U.S. 133, 137 (1894).
alCase law has generally held a zoning ordinance unreasonable and therefore,
an invalid exercise of police power requiring compensation, if the ordinance
appears manifestly unjust. See State Bank & Trust Co. v. Village of Wilmette,
358 Ill. 311, 193 N.E. 1x (1934); Daniels v. City of Portland, 124 Ore. 677, 265
P. 790 (1928).
"Police power prevents the owner from using his property in a way that is
injurious to the general public, while eminent domain uses the owner's property
to the benefit of the general public. See Moton v. City of Phoenix, ioo Ariz. 23, 410
P.od 93 (1966).
8GSee notes 86-87 supra.
901d.
"'See, e.g., Corneal v. State Plant Bd., 95 So. 2d I (Fla. 1957); E. FREUND, THE
POLICE POWER, § 520 at 554 (1904).
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individual in relation to the public benefit, the courts usually arrive
at a decision requiring compensation.92
Compensation is required if the government actually takes private
property, even if the basis for such action involves an exercise of the
police power.93 However, there is one exception to this general postu-
late. Affirmative municipal action necessitated by natural disasters and
"eminent peril" emergencies other than riots and civil disorders, has
been consistently classified as a valid exercise of police power not re-
quiring compensation.94 These actions, which are intended to circum-
vent certain disaster, are authorized by specific statutory grants.95 In
the absence of such grants, the degree of necessity occasioning property
destruction is a question of fact and it must be proven that the property
owners suffered no destruction than would otherwise have occurred. 90
The property cannot be destroyed if the conditions which made it a
menace can be abated in any other recognized way.O7 In emergencies
necessitating property destruction such as fires, infected livestock, and
property certain to fall into enemy hands, it is the property which is a
menace to the public welfare. The property itself is an indispensible
element of the danger to safety and health. The private building in the
path of a raging conflagration is fuel for the fire, the livestock herds
provide life for infectious virus, and a munitions factory provides
strength for the enemy. The property itself presents a danger to the
public. In such cases, destruction without compensation is permitted.98
However, in the case of violent disorders the structures in the riot af-
fected area are not in themselves indispensible elements of the danger
to the safety of citizens or their property. The menace created by rioters
is not dependent on the continued existence of the surrounding private
"See text accompanying notes 86-9o supra.
"See text accompanying notes 75-80 supra.
"Examples of these emergency acts are destroying property to keep it from
falling into the hands of an advancing enemy, United States v. Caltex, M4 US.
149 (1952), destroying a building to prevent the advance of a spreading fire, Bowditch
v. Boston, ioi U.S. 16 (1879), and draining a private pond in an effort to locate
a murdered body, McCoy v. Sanders, 113 Ga. App. 565, 148 S.E.2d 9o2 (1966).
'See, e.g., Dudley v. Orange County, 137 So. 2d 85! (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1962)
(civil defense statute providing for temporary damming to prevent extensive floods);
Jackson v. Bell, 143 Tenn. 452, 226 S.W. 207 (1920) (statute providing for destruction
of property by fire commissioner for purpose of preventing spread of conflagration
to other buildings).
"To justify the destruction of property by necessity, it must be proven that the
necessity was inevitable, or that the plaintiff suffered no loss by the destruction
than would otherwise have occurred. Hale v. Lawrence, 21 N.J.L. 714 (1848).
See also Sentell v. New Orleans & C.R. Co., 166 U.S. 698 (1896); Bishop v. Mayor
of Macon, 7 Ga. 200, 50 Am. Dec. 400 (1849).
"See, e.g., City of Houston v. Lurie, 148 Tex. 391, 244 S.W.2d 871, 879 (1949).
"8Note 94 supra.
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property. Consequently, the power to destroy property out of necessity
may not be applicable in a riot situation, and consequently compensa-
tion is required.99
It is arguable, therefore, that when a municipality is presented with
the choice of whether to exercise the police power to avert damage or to
allow destruction by rioters and the municipality chooses the latter
course in the public interest, it should be responsible to the private
9SEven if the theory of destruction out of necessity is applicable to a con-
trolled riot situation, the doctrine itself may be due for a reevaluation. The
origin of the theory is found in The Case of the King's Prerogative in Saltpetre, 77
Eng. Rep. 1294. That case held that an owner of land was not entitled to compensa-
tion from the King for saltpetre mined from his property and later used in the
manufacture of gunpowder. Although the court's language indicated that the
confiscated material was necessary for the defense and safety of the realm, the
powerful position of the King was probably also a factor. An early American case
which adopted the necessity doctrine was Respublica v. Sparhawk, i Dall. 357
(Pa. 1788) , a case involving the destruction of a building to prevent the spread
of an approaching fire. The court stated that, "[i]t is a rule, however, that it is
better to suffer a private mischief, than a public inconvenience; and the rights of
necessity, form a part of our law." i Dall. at 362. The United States Supreme
Court, in Bowditch v. Boston, io1 U.S. 16 (1879), later recognized the rule of
necessity by accepting the English common law precedent established in Saltpetre
and Respublica. However, precedents should always be subject to reevaluation by
the courts. As Justice Holmes stated in HoLmms, THE COMMON LAW (1881),
The official theory is that each new decision follows syllogistically
from existing precendents. But just as the clavacle in the cat only
tells of the existence of some earlier creature to which a collar-bone
was useful, precedents survive in the law long after the use they
once served is at an end and the reason for them has been for-
gotten. The result of following them must often be failure and con-
fusion from the merely logical point of view.
HoL~mS at 35- In addition, one American jurist, while commenting upon the
English common law background of the rule of necessity, has stated,
The abuse of the admitted rights which inevitable necessity con-
fers, and the habit of confounding these rights with the doctrines
of prerogative, disregarding the just distinction between them,
probably led to the provision in our constitution forbidding private
property from being taken for the public use without just
compensation.
Russell v. The Mayor of New York, 2 Denio 461, 487 (N.Y. 1845). Early American
jurists have warned against the -blind adherence to precedent and have raised
questions as to the propriety of the destruction by necessity doctrine. At least one
modem jurist has criticized the doctrine on the basis of a shift in the emphasis
of public policy in America. Justice Douglas, in his dissenting opinion in United
States v. Caltex, 344 U.S. 149 (1952), stated,
It seems to me that the guiding principle should be this: When-
ever the Government determines that one person's property-
whatever it may be-is essential to the [public good] and appropri-
ates it for the common good, the public purse, rather than the
individual, should bear the loss.
344 U.S. at 156
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